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A B S T R A C T
Against the background of conﬂict in the Great Lakes Region, the UK and
France promised, at their  Saint-Malo summit, to set aside rivalries and
cooperate on Africa. In subsequent Anglo-French gatherings, they singled out
the DRC and pledged to work together there to promote peace and tackle
poverty. This article asks whether this coordination took place and whether it
involved a ‘deconﬂictualisation’ of approaches, ‘coincidental’ cooperation, or
‘sustained and reciprocal’ collaboration. It looks for evidence of institutionalisa-
tion of UK-French ties and policy cooperation in the ﬁelds of peacebuilding
and poverty reduction. It then identiﬁes the pressures for, and barriers to,
collaboration, focusing particularly on the role of interests, foreign policy
norms, institutional factors and resource constraints. It concludes by setting out
the wider implications of UK-French cooperation and the limited prospects of
closer future collaboration.
I N T R O D U C T I O N
By the end of the twentieth century, the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC) had become the battleground for ‘Africa’s ﬁrst world war’
(Oxfam ), and the target of a renewed scramble for its vast mineral
wealth. It was against this backdrop that Britain and France committed
themselves, at their December  Saint-Malo summit, to set aside
past rivalries and ‘harmonise their policies’ towards Africa (Saint-Malo
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Declaration ). At their Anglo-French summit in February , the
UK and France singled out the DRC and promised to ‘intensify
their joint efforts to promote lasting peace’ in this war-torn country
(Cahors Communiqué ). Then, in November , they ident-
iﬁed the DRC as one of only two African states included in their Action
Plan on Franco-British Development Cooperation, and pledged to ‘work
together in support of country-owned poverty reduction strategies’
(Action Plan ).
While similar promises were repeated at subsequent summits, there
was no attempt to spell out the terms of the intended cooperation. Was it
simply to involve a process of ‘deconﬂictualisation’, where the UK
and France avoid public quarrels and play down divergences in their
overall policy priorities? Or was the aim to engage in ‘coincidental
cooperation’, where London and Paris collaborate actively but do so
only at times of crisis or when their goals converge ‘naturally’? Or was
the idea to engage in ‘sustained and reciprocal cooperation’, where
Britain and France work in partnership over a prolonged period, while
aligning their policy objectives and instruments?
Surprisingly perhaps, given the potential importance of this initiative
for Africa’s Great Lakes Region and for Europe’s Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP), no scholarly attention has been given to the
question of UK-French bilateral cooperation or ‘bi-multi’ collaboration
(where the UK and France work together to bring other donors on
board) in the DRC. There has inevitably been some focus on European
Union (EU) cooperation (Gegout ), particularly with reference to
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) military and civilian
missions (Chafer & Cumming ; Keane ). However, there has
been no recent analysis of British relations with the DRC, while studies
of Franco-Congolese ties date back to the late s and highlight
competition between France and ‘Anglo-Saxon powers’, notably the
United States (Huliaras ). This article addresses these issues. It
begins by examining the nature of, and interests underpinning, past
Anglo-French rivalry in the Congo. Drawing on over  off-the-record
interviews in Kinshasa and with ofﬁcials and former ofﬁcials in the
British and French Foreign Ministries, European Commission (EC) and
United Nations (UN), it looks for evidence over the last decade or so
of any new institutional framework for UK-French dialogue, and any
bilateral cooperation in the ﬁelds of peacebuilding and poverty
reduction. It evaluates the extent of this collaboration using a typology
(set out in Table  below) that distinguishes between three types
or levels of cooperation, namely ‘deconﬂictualisation’, ‘coincidental
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cooperation’, and ‘sustained and reciprocal collaboration’. It then
identiﬁes the pressures on the UK and France to engage in some degree
of coordination. Next, it examines the constraints that prevented closer
collaboration, including divergent interests, different foreign policy
norms (that is, differences over how to achieve a broadly similar set of
policy goals), institutional factors and resource constraints. It concludes
by setting out the wider implications of Anglo-French cooperation and
the limited prospects of closer future collaboration.
Before proceeding, it is important to sharpen our focus. First, this
article concentrates on relations between UK and French ofﬁcials and
governing elites, rather than any linkages between non-state actors.
Second, it focuses on cooperation speciﬁcally in the areas of peace-
building and poverty reduction and does not, for reasons of space,
explore related ﬁelds, such as justice reform. Third, it does not assess
the impact of Anglo-French cooperation in terms of policy outcomes.
This would be difﬁcult, given how inﬂuential other actors are in the
DRC, notably China (the largest investor), Belgium (the ex-colonial
power and main trading partner), the United States (the key regional
peace-broker), South Africa and Angola (regional actors with a central
role in security sector reform (SSR)), the EU (the largest source of aid),
and MONUC (now MONUSCO: the UN’s most expensive peacekeeping
mission). Finally, this study does not assume that Britain and France
should necessarily work together in response to every challenge facing
the DRC. Instead, it evaluates and explains the extent to which they did
or, in many cases, did not do so in recent years. In assessing the level of
cooperation observed, it focuses on the actual policy objectives being
pursued and the behavioural norms, that is, the standard operating
procedures, favoured delivery mechanisms and cultural preferences,
which each country typically adopted in pursuit of those objectives. In
practice, as we will see, it was often these differing norms, rather than
explicitly opposed interests or policy goals, that pushed British and
French approaches to intervention in the DRC in different directions.
R I V A L R Y I N T H E F A C E O F C H A O S
From colonial times to the early post-Cold War era, the UK and France
pursued rival agendas and were driven by divergent interests in
the Congo. The rivalry can best be understood with reference to three
pivotal moments. The ﬁrst came at the time of colonisation when Britain
and France both had an interest in taking over all or part of the Congo.
Having failed to secure paramountcy over the mouth of the river Congo,
B R I T A I N A N D F R A N C E I N T H E D R C O N G O
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the UK signed a treaty with Portugal in , backing the latter’s claims
in the region in exchange for exclusive navigation rights in the Congo
Basin (Anstey : –). France was alarmed by this treaty which,
had it not been rescinded, would have hampered its development of its
neighbouring colony, present-day Congo-Brazzaville. The French were
even more dismayed when, at the – Berlin Congress, they were
obliged to recognise claims by the Belgian King, Léopold II, to the vast
territory known as the Congo Free State (Trefon ).
A resurgence in Anglo-French rivalry occurred in , at the time of
Belgium’s ill-prepared decolonisation of the Belgian Congo (as it
became known in ), when the UK and France saw an opportunity
to pursue their rival interests, particularly in the mineral-rich Katanga
province. This second ﬂashpoint triggered an army mutiny, the
secession of Katanga, the mounting of a UN operation, the assassination
of the Congo’s Marxist-leaning Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, and,
in , a coup by the French/Belgian/US-backed general Joseph-
Désiré Mobutu. Amidst the chaos, the UK and France ofﬁcially
supported the UN aim of preserving Congolese territorial integrity.
Yet behind the scenes, they were helping Katangese secessionists,
albeit towards different ends. The British Foreign Minister, Lord
Home, and backbenchers in the ruling Conservative government
were sympathetic to the demands of UK-owned companies, such as
Tanganyika Concessions, which were calling for Katanga’s indepen-
dence or its integration into the Central African Federation (CAF – a
semi-independent entity grouping three former UK dependencies:
present-day Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi) ( Janes : –). The
French government actually supplied weapons and mercenaries to
the rebels. Its aim was to block the integration of Katanga into the
CAF, break up the Belgian Congo, and facilitate territorial gains by
neighbouring Congo-Brazzaville under its pro-French leader, Abbé
Youlou (Trefon : –).
The third ﬂashpoint came in the mid s, by which time Britain
had become a relatively insigniﬁcant player in Zaïre (as the Congo
was known from  to ), whilst France had emerged as its
leading military backer (EIU : ). After suspending development
assistance in , the French reverted three years later to a policy of
unconditional support to President Mobutu, ostensibly in recognition of
his backing for France’s –military intervention in Rwanda and his
acceptance, in , of over a million Rwandan refugees. In so doing,
France put itself on a collision course with the UK and the USA,
which wanted the kleptocratic Mobutu removed and supported, directly
 G O R D O N D . C U M M I N G
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or indirectly, the  military campaign by the Alliance des Forces Démo-
cratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaire (AFDL – an alliance of Congolese
Tutsis, Rwandans, Ugandans and Angolans, headed by Laurent
Kabila). On  November , the French backed, within the UN
Security Council (UNSC), a proposed Canadian-led mission to repatri-
ate Rwandan refugees. The intervention won cautious backing from
the USA and the UK, which agreed to provide one battalion
(IRIN ). Yet this support was withdrawn when, following an
AFDL attack, , Rwandan refugees began returning home. The
French government responded in January  by covertly levying
 mercenaries in a failed attempt to save Mobutu (Agir Ici-Survie
: ). Then, on  March, France called for an EU military-
humanitarian operation. However, this was blocked by the UK (The
Guardian ..), prompting French ofﬁcials to grumble that Mobutu’s
downfall was ‘all the work of the Defence Intelligence Agency . . . and
MI’ (The Times ..).
UK-French relations in Congo were traditionally marred by a number
of factors. The ﬁrst was ‘competitive clientelism’ (Youngs : ),
that is, Britain and France’s hard-nosed pursuit of their rival interests,
coupled with their reluctance to tackle, individually or jointly, the
Congo’s poverty- and security-related challenges. The second was the
different relative importance that the British and French attached to
Zaïre. This was clearly reﬂected in the size of their aid programmes.
Thus, between  and , the UK provided on average US$.
million and was only just one of the top ten donors, whereas France
gave ﬁve times more aid (US$. million a year), and was regularly
one of Zaire/Congo’s top three donors (see Table ). The ﬁnal
constraint was the absence of forums for constructive Anglo-French
dialogue. The UNSC and EU allowed for discussions but were used
by the UK in – to delay or block French-backed calls for
international intervention in Zaïre. The Anglo-French summit was also
potentially useful but, despite focusing on the Great Lakes in November
, failed to secure any Anglo-French consensus (Press Association
..).
S A I N T - M A L O A N D B E Y O N D : T O W A R D S A N E W I N S T I T U T I O N A L
F R A M E W O R K ?
At their  Saint-Malo summit, the UK and France promised to break
with past rivalry and ‘pursue close cooperation on the ground in Africa’
(Saint-Malo Declaration ). At subsequent summits, they made
B R I T A I N A N D F R A N C E I N T H E D R C O N G O
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 24 Feb 2014 IP address: 131.251.254.13
speciﬁc pledges to work together in the DRC to promote peace and
reduce poverty.
Initially, these promises barely camouﬂaged a continuation, even a
widening, of Anglo-French rivalry across the Great Lakes region. Indeed,
Britain and France made only perfunctory efforts to deconﬂictualise
their approaches in the early years following Saint-Malo. Thus, while the
UK and French Foreign Ministers, Jack Straw and Hubert Védrine,
undertook a joint visit to the Great Lakes in January , the two men
proved unable to paper over their differences, with Straw focusing solely
on the need for the DRC to disarm Rwandan Hutu militias, while
Védrine called on Rwanda and Uganda to withdraw their troops in
tandem with the disarmament of Hutus (Financial Times ..).
Similarly, while London and Paris both adopted a common European
line on the restoration of aid to the DRC in December , they did
so only after a dispute in which France and Belgium pushed for
development assistance to be resumed immediately, whereas Britain and
the EC sought to delay this decision until the Congolese had shown
greater commitment to the peace negotiations. Within the UNSC,
too, there were disagreements. Thus, while the British and French
Permanent Representatives sought to elide their instructions ‘so that it
didn’t sound as if the UK was harder on Kinshasa and France harder on
Kigali’ (ex-FCO ofﬁcial int., December ), they failed to conceal
a row in November  over the composition of MONUC, which
included, in France’s view, too prominent a role for British personnel
for a mission in a French-speaking state (Gegout : ). Nor could
they disguise divergences over the April  and October  reports
by the UN Panel of Experts. The UK rejected the Panel’s early ﬁndings
which exposed illegal practices by UK mining companies and revealed
the extent to which the Ugandan and Rwandan regimes, both close to
the British government, were plundering Congolese mineral resources.
The French by contrast had been the driving force behind the Panel,
providing it with intelligence and ‘an unofﬁcial mandate’ to criticise
Rwanda and Uganda for ‘occupying the DRC not so much for security
reasons as for economic reasons’ (Nest : ).
This lack of cooperation has to be understood in context. The
Rwandan genocide had created a faultline between the UK, which saw
the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) as a force for good and
the Hutu-based Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) as
unambiguous genocidaires, and the French – or rather elements within
the French system – who considered the RPF as illegitimate rebels
and the FDLR as legitimate political actors (FCO int., June ).
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Subsequently, the outbreak of the second Congolese war in August 
widened the rift between Britain, which became a leading backer of the
Rwandan government, both bilaterally and in Brussels, and France,
which, after winning over Laurent Kabila in , became the DRC’s key
Western supporter. This situation was exacerbated by the unpredict-
ability of President Laurent Kabila, who expelled the number two in the
French embassy in December  before throwing out six British
diplomats on allegations of spying in March  (The Guardian
..). Finally, the prospects for cooperation were further weakened
by Britain’s Secretary of State for International Development, Clare
Short, who blindly provided budgetary assistance that was subsequently
used to fund Rwandan and Ugandan war efforts in the Congo (Porteous
: –).
It was not until the end of the ‘ofﬁcial’ conﬂict and the creation,
in June , of a Congolese Government of National Unity and
Transition (henceforth the ‘transitional government’) that Britain
and France opened meaningful channels for dialogue. Crucially, the
UK, which had only three staff in its mission in  (Hilary Benn,
Hansard ..: col. WH), began building up a large permanent
Department for International Development (DFID) ofﬁce, while France
reopened the Agence Française de Développement (AFD) in  after a
closure lasting eleven years. Closer Anglo-French cooperation was also
facilitated by the creation in  of the International Committee for
the Accompaniment of the Transition (henceforth the CIAT), a donor
steering committee established to oversee the transition. Chaired by the
UN, the CIAT included ambassadors from the UK, France, the USA,
China, Russia, Belgium, Canada, South Africa, plus high-level represen-
tatives of the African Union (AU), EC and EU. Within the CIAT, the UK
‘worked together with the French in practice and in a close way’, and
‘dissent was never shown in public’ (MONUC int., May ). This
closeness was facilitated by a rapport between UK and French
ambassadors, Andy Sparkes and Georges Serre, and by the diversity
of views within the CIAT, which made the British and French appear
like-minded.
After the  elections and the CIAT’s disbandment, the UK and
France helped establish new donor forums, such as the ‘Security Council
Plus’ and the ‘P plus ’. The former was an information-sharing session
chaired by MONUC and involving the ambassadors of Security Council
member states with a mission in Kinshasa, key African countries and
representatives of the AU, EU and EC. The latter was more inﬂuential,
comprising the UK, France and the US (‘the P’), together with
B R I T A I N A N D F R A N C E I N T H E D R C O N G O
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Belgium and South Africa, and meeting fortnightly at ambassadorial
level. There were, in addition, P plus  meetings involving heads of
development cooperation and political counsellors. Equally, there were
regular talks between European Heads of Mission and Heads of
Development Cooperation, as well gatherings of the Great Lakes
Contact Group and of the ‘International Facilitation’, each of which
included UK and French representatives. In New York, too, there were
shadow meetings of the P plus  and UK-French consultations on the
UNSC over revisions to MONUC’s mandate (French Foreign Ministry
int., January ).
Alongside these gatherings, the UK and France established closer
bilateral ties. By early , the British and French defence attachés had
forged good relations and were collaborating on the renovation of a
junior staff college in Kinshasa, the reopening of an initial ofﬁcer
training school in Kitona, and the training of the Congolese infantry
battalion for the African stand-by force. By November , the UK
and French Foreign Ministers, David Miliband and Bernard Kouchner,
had undertaken a joint visit to the Great Lakes. This trip was symbolically
important as a show of unity but will mainly be remembered for the
febrile speculation it generated over a possible European military
intervention in eastern DRC. The visit was followed up in the spring
when the French Foreign Ministry sent a delegation to London to
discuss a paper on the DRC prepared by the FCO Strategy Unit. More
recently, in September , the French president, Nicolas Sarkozy,
appointed Christian Conan as Great Lakes special representative, and
one of Conan’s ﬁrst trips was to London, followed by another to
Washington where he met UK and US ofﬁcials (French Foreign Ministry
int., June ).
It would, however, be wrong to overstate the capacity for such
exchanges to bring about an alignment of UK and French policy goals or
of the behavioural norms used in pursuit of those goals. The UK and
France were certainly involved in a plethora of multilateral forums and
made efforts to avoid public disagreements. Yet if the British and French
were actually engaged in ‘sustained and reciprocal cooperation’, they
might have been expected to share the burden of attending these
meetings. It is also worth adding that some ‘bilateral’ Anglo-French
exchanges within multilateral groupings only came about because the
UK (as in the EU Working Group on Human Rights) or France (as in
the EU Advisory and Assistance Mission (EUSEC), discussed later)
happened to head a particular body. Signiﬁcantly too, the UK preferred
to work through the UN, where it was on a par with France as a
 G O R D O N D . C U M M I N G
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permanent Security Council member, while the French, except on
issues speciﬁc to the UN (e.g., MONUC’s mandate), were more inclined
to work through the EU and via ESDP missions.
Nor was there any concerted effort to formalise bilateral exchanges.
Indeed, tentative plans in  to establish a joint UK-French ofﬁce in
Goma, eastern DRC, seem to have been shelved. The emphasis
remained on ad hoc, informal and personal ties between ofﬁcials and
politicians who happened to ‘get on’. In practice this has led to two
planned joint Foreign Ministerial visits to the DRC being cancelled in
recent years, and the  trip coming about coincidentally when
Bernard Kouchner extended a last-minute invitation to his British
counterpart (former UK Minister int., December ).
T O W A R D S P A R T N E R S H I P I N P R A C T I C E ?
Having shown that the UK and France opened channels for communi-
cation, we must now ask whether, particularly after the creation of the
transitional government in , they honoured their promises to
intensify ‘joint efforts to promote peace’ and to ‘support . . . country-
owned poverty strategies’. To answer this question, we must return to,
and differentiate fully, the three categories of cooperation highlighted
in our introduction and elucidated in more detail in Table .
The ﬁrst is ‘deconﬂictualisation’. Here the UK and France share
broadly similar policy goals and, either totally or partially (in the case of
‘semi-deconﬂictualisation’), set aside past rivalries, avoid unnecessary
duplication and publicly play down differences in their agendas. In some
instances, deconﬂictualisation can involve a degree of negotiation to
ensure a reconciliation of positions, and it is often the prerequisite for
TA B L E 
Typology of levels of Anglo-French state cooperation
Category
Shared
overall
policy goals
Common
foreign policy
norms
Convergent
interests
Cooperation in
practice
Deconﬂictualisation Yesa Limiteda No No
Coincidental
Cooperation
Yes Limiteda Limiteda Limiteda
Sustained and reciprocal
cooperation
Yes Yes Yes Yes
a The degree of commonality will largely depend upon the issue and timeframe involved.
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other types of cooperation. At the same time, however, it does not mean
that donors actively work together on speciﬁc projects or that they
seek to align their interests or foreign policy norms. The second is
‘coincidental cooperation’, where Britain and France harmonise policy
instruments and collaborate actively on policy issues and in the ﬁeld, but
do so only sporadically over the short term, and where policy goals and
interests converge ‘naturally’. The third is ‘sustained and reciprocal
cooperation’, where the countries work in partnership over a prolonged
period, while also seeking to harmonise policy goals and instruments
over the longer term. Needless to say, this typology has drawbacks. For a
start, these categories cannot be entirely separated, and collaboration
may more accurately be plotted anywhere on a continuum ranging from
sustained collaboration through to active non-cooperation, where
Britain and France’s policy objectives and interests, as well as the steps
they take to realise them, are actively opposed to each other. While
active non-cooperation remains an option for the UK and France,
this category is not included in our typology as it is, by deﬁnition, not
a form of collaboration. Furthermore, the typology does not fully
distinguish between implicit cooperation, where countries share the
same objective or are members of the same forum but do not negotiate
over their positions, and explicit coordination, where states consciously
work together to pursue similar goals, promote synergies or establish
common instruments. Finally it does not explicitly differentiate between
bilateral and bi-multi cooperation, which often take place in parallel,
leading in practice to a process best described as ‘messy multilateralism’
(Chafer : ). Even so, it will be argued, the categories delineated
here offer useful indicators of the different degrees of coordination and
help distinguish between areas of collaboration and non-cooperation.
Working together to secure a lasting peace
To begin with British and French efforts to promote peace, here the
focus is on securing the democratic transition, peacekeeping missions,
and reforms to the police and army.
Securing the democratic process
The British and French shared broadly the same policy goals on demo-
cratic reform, and thus managed to engage in active, if ‘coincidental’,
cooperation to secure the DRC’s democratic process. They worked
together closely throughout the transition phase (–), and in the
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crucial period immediately before and after the  elections. They
emerged as the leading contributors to the elections, with the UK
providing over Emillion and France supplying a further Emillion,
together with police ofﬁcers and troops (French embassy Kinshasa,
n.d.). In , the UK, through its DFID conﬂict adviser, and France,
through its defence attaché, pushed jointly for an election security
strategy. Britain and France took the lead, alongside the Congo’s
Interior Minister, in bringing in other partners and ensuring the
establishment of a steering committee for election security (DFID int.,
May ). Subsequently, London and Paris worked together to
approve missions aimed at securing the electoral process: EU Police
(EUPOL)-Kinshasa in  and EU Force (EUFOR)-DRC mission in
 (discussed later). Also in , the UK funded a project aimed at
training judges to handle electoral disputes and contracted out much of
this activity to the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (DFID int.,
May ). British efforts to ﬁnd a project partner were facilitated by the
French aid mission, the Service de Coopération et d’Action Culturelle (SCAC).
Also ahead of the elections, in early , the UK and France
established an informal donor grouping for harmonising media
capacity-building work, with France initially serving as co-chair and
with Britain’s ‘views being represented by France’ (DFID int., May
). After the elections, they were among the donors pushing for a
‘governance compact’ designed to increase DRC government account-
ability (Hoebeke et al. : ). Subsequently, in , they created an
informal civil society group, headed by the UK, France and the UN
Development Programme (UNDP), to promote donor coordination of
civil society programming. Also in , they set up a four-year ‘silent
partnership’ (an innovative arrangement in which one donor provides
the funding and another executes the project) to promote democratic
governance and an independent media. DFID provided £ million
to this joint media project, Britain’s largest in Africa, while the SCAC
offered the ofﬁce space and France Coopération Internationale (FCI), a
French state-funded media body, supplied the expertise.
There were also, however, instances where the UK and France failed
to cooperate. This non-cooperation came to the fore towards the end of
the transitional period, when the British were pushing for political space
to be created for an effective opposition, whereas the French, whose
view won out thanks to Belgian backing, were essentially advocating
unconditional support for Joseph Kabila as head of the transitional
government and DRC president since his father’s assassination in
January  (AFP ..). There were, behind the scenes, other
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instances of non-cooperation or at best deconﬂictualisation, but these
were camouﬂaged by the fact that the UK and France operated within
the same multilateral forum. To illustrate, both Britain and France, in
line with their commitments as members of the EU Working Group on
Human Rights, signed up to a robust European policy on human rights
and local democracy. Yet they did not do so as a result of any explicit
exchanges or shared conviction. Thus, while the British government was
generally – in the DRC if not in Rwanda – a stout defendant of human
rights and, with a contribution of £ million, a stalwart supporter of
local elections, France was more equivocal. Indeed, while the French
underscored their European credentials by subscribing to a common
EU discourse on human rights, in practice they opted for a pragmatic,
uncritical approach that gave priority to stability and the preservation of
France’s close links to the Congolese government.
Furthermore, while the ‘silent partnership’ outlined above was indeed
an example of active cooperation, the media and governance project
only came about ‘by accident’, as a result of a momentary coincidence
of agendas (DFID int., October ). Thus, the UK was aiming to
rationalise its stafﬁng and seeking a donor (not necessarily the French)
with the expertise to deliver its media programme, while the French
coincidentally had the capacity (a permanent media attaché in its
mission) but lacked the funding to mount a large-scale project. While
this convergence of goals was enough to seal the deal, cooperation was
initially stilted, as DFID sought reassurances that the FCI could deliver
the project effectively and in a way consistent with DFID’s standard
operating procedures (DFID int., ). There was, moreover, no
attempt to extend this partnership or replicate it in other sectors, even
though DFID needed operators to implement its programmes, while
cash-strapped French agencies were keen to offer their services.
Peacekeeping missions
Turning to peacekeeping missions, here too there was, after , active
though ‘coincidental’ cooperation. From June to September ,
Britain and France participated in Operation Artemis, a European
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) military mission aimed at stabilising
the humanitarian situation in Bunia (eastern DRC) when, following the
withdrawal of Ugandan forces, ﬁghting escalated and MONUC failed to
cope. Artemis was the ﬁrst EU mission to be launched independently of
NATO and the ﬁrst outside Europe. Despite continuing troop commit-
ments in Iraq, the UK managed nonetheless to send one hundred
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engineers, who played a key role, resurfacing the runway at Bunia, thus
enabling supplies to be ﬂown in. Britain also pushed Rwanda to
accept the EU force and persuaded Uganda to offer airport facilities at
Entebbe (Bagayoko : ). France was ‘the driving political force’
and ‘framework nation’, providing the operational headquarters, the
intelligence and % of the ,-strong force for this geographically
limited operation (Gegout : ).
Although ground-breaking, Artemis only came about thanks to a
timely convergence of British and French agendas on common security
concerns in the Great Lakes and a shared interest in patching up
differences on the international scene. The UK was alarmed at the
possibility of genocide in the DRC, anxious to prove that London was
still interested in developing a European defence capability, and keen to
‘paper over the cracks’ that the Iraq War had created within Europe
(Olsen : ). France shared many of these concerns, and
also ‘badly wanted a mission to show the EU was capable of acting
alone, where NATO would not be involved’ (Gegout : ). The
French were, moreover, desperate to ensure British participation, as the
operation was in an inaccessible area close to the Rwandan border,
and could bring French troops into contact with Congolese militias close
to the Rwandan regime (Gegout : ).
The second mission was EUFOR-DRC ( July–November ), which
supported the UN in supervising the  elections. While the British
did not send combat troops, partly due to concerns about military
overstretch, they did approve EUFOR within the European Political and
Security Committee (PSC), as well as supporting it politically in a
joint statement by UK and French Defence Ministers, John Reid and
Michèle Alliot-Marie (AFP ..). The French deployed, together
with Germany, the largest number of troops for this mission, which
involved , soldiers in and around Kinshasa plus , troops on-call
in neighbouring Gabon. France also provided the force commander
and press-ganged Germany into providing the operational head-
quarters.
As with Artemis, Anglo-French cooperation was coincidental, reﬂect-
ing a convergence of agendas at the time of the operation. For London,
the stability of the DRC was paramount: the UK was a signiﬁcant
contributor to SSR and the largest bilateral funder of the elections.
For Paris, EUFOR was also about stability. But it was even more
importantly a means of building EU military capacity, particularly in the
context of the  EU Strategy for Africa. Equally, it had ‘to do with
French–German cohesion’, and with bolstering the ESDP’s credibility
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after the rejection of the European Constitutional Treaty (IHT
..).
Anglo-French collaboration on peacekeeping missions thus came
about thanks to a convergence of agendas and a readiness, in the face of
crisis, to temporarily align policy instruments. Cooperation, however,
was not sustained, and was not driven by any overriding need to work
together on crises in the DRC. The patchy nature of collaboration in the
face of such crises was exposed in Bukavu (), Rutshuru () and
Sake () when humanitarian missions could have been but were not
mounted, ostensibly to avoid undermining MONUC. This was revealed
in late , when the dissident Tutsi general, Laurent Nkunda, looked
like taking Goma. Initially, Bernard Kouchner mooted the possibility of
an intervention, while the UK Foreign Secretary refused to rule this out
(AFP ..). Within days, however, Kouchner’s enthusiasm had
been curbed by President Sarkozy, and the UK, as one of two countries
heading European battle groups, had dismissed the idea of military
involvement, citing commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the
end, the French, who held the EU presidency, abandoned the idea and
lobbied, with the UK, for more troops for MONUC and a better
deployment of existing forces.
Reforming the police
On police reform, the UK and France were able for the most part to
deconﬂictualise their approaches. They began to limit duplication
of effort when, in December , they approved a DRC government
request to help establish an Integrated Police Unit (IPU) to protect
Congolese state institutions. They took another step towards coordi-
nation when they backed the launch, in April , of EUPOL-Kinshasa,
a European civilian police mission to mentor IPU actions in Kinshasa
during the transition. The UK and France provided complementary
forms of support to EUPOL, with the British – who were short of French-
speaking police ofﬁcers – contributing mainly equipment and funding,
and the French supplying over a third of the police contingent. The two
countries backed extensions of EUPOL’s mandate, as well as widening
the remit of this body (renamed EUPOL-DRC in July ) to include
security issues in eastern Congo. They also consistently supported
EUPOL in negotiations with the Congolese government over future
police reforms.
However, the limits to cooperation were revealed when, in January
, a European fact-ﬁnding mission observed that there was little
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donor coordination on policing, ‘with the French having trained a unit
following its own chain-of-command and the South Africans, ﬁnanced
by the British, having trained police SWAT teams with another chain-
of-command, different equipment and different communication
systems’ (ESDP mission int., May ). There were clearly disagree-
ments between the UK and France over how to achieve the desired goal
of a peaceful, well-policed state, and differing behavioural norms were
most apparent in this area. In this context, for example, it emerged
during the elections that the British were planning, together with
South Africa, a national system for police radio communication, while
the French had set aside funding for different equipment and a radio
transmission centre. This resulted in a stand-off that was eventually
resolved in favour of the UK. Other divergences persisted beyond the
elections. For example, the UK advocated ‘community policing’ by
unarmed ofﬁcers, while France remained more inclined towards riot
control (ESDP mission int., May ). Signiﬁcantly too, the UK urged
EUPOL to follow the template laid down by the British in Sierra Leone,
with the appointment of a single police Inspector-General and the
provision of large-scale DFID funding. However, while such a solution
was possible in a small ex-British colony, it was deemed unacceptable by
the French, Belgians and Congolese to have a UK police ofﬁcer assume
such a key position in this huge francophone country (ESDP mission
int., May ).
Restructuring the army
Britain and France only managed to ‘semi-deconﬂictualise’ their
approaches towards army restructuring. They took their ﬁrst major
step towards coordination when they approved the deployment, in May
, of the EUSEC army reform mission. After that, the UK and
France contributed to the common costs of this programme through the
CFSP budget, supported moves towards weekly meetings, and approved
extensions of EUSEC’s mandate as well as some merging of the
functions of EUSEC and EUPOL. London and Paris also managed to
avoid replicating each other’s activities within EUSEC, largely by
drawing upon their own favoured policy instruments. Thus, the UK
acted mainly in a funding capacity, regularly ﬁnancing – out of the
Africa Conﬂict Prevention Pool and the Whitehall Peacekeeping
Budget – a handful of French-speaking staff within EUSEC, and
contributing heavily to the cost of its biometric schemes to identify
Congolese soldiers and its chain-of-payments project to stop soldiers
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being defrauded of their salaries. Meanwhile, France supplied the
largest military and civilian contingent, as well as heading the mission,
initially under General Pierre-Michel Joana then under General
Jean-Paul Michel.
Yet, while the UK and France both aimed to promote a peaceful DRC,
they failed to agree on the policy norms and instruments needed to
secure this overarching objective. In particular, they failed to work to the
same agenda on army reform. The UK for its part sought to ensure that
EUSEC ‘acted more broadly’ and served as the main channel through
which European donors engaged with SSR (MoD int., June ).
For France, however, EUSEC should only have an ‘advisory function’
and should merely ‘coordinate the bilateral military assistance efforts
of its member states’ (French Defence Ministry int., May ). These
divergent visions persisted, partly because the DRC government under-
mined donor efforts at coordination on SSR and partly because the UK
and France had rival perspectives on, and roughly equal inﬂuence over,
questions of army reform and SSR more generally (Melmot : ).
In effect, the UK saw its ‘impact devalued’ within EUSEC by its failure to
contribute military personnel but was generally held in esteem by other
donors on SSR. Conversely, the French enjoyed greater inﬂuence within
EUSEC, thanks to their staff contributions and their role – alongside the
Belgians – as the original proponents of this mission (Hoebeke et al.
: ). Yet they were not at the forefront of donor thinking on SSR,
and were widely thought to have remained ‘within their comfort zone’
in the DRC, taking ‘a fairly bilateral approach’ and focusing on hard
military training and the integration of French ofﬁcers within the
Congolese army (ESDP mission int., May .). Such an approach to
army reform, alongside France’s continued bilateral support for
Congolese policing, might, on the face of it, be viewed as an attempt
to consolidate French inﬂuence over the levers of power in the DRC.
The divergences with the UK over these reforms appeared, however, to
stem less from conﬂicting interests and more from divergent behav-
ioural norms relating to the kind of policing and army structuring
(essentially the British versus the French model) that was most
appropriate to the needs of the DRC.
Tackling poverty together
Turning to poverty reduction, here too the UK and France only semi-
deconﬂictualised their approaches. In , Britain and France began
drafting, together with ﬁfteen other donors, a Country Assistance
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Framework (CAF) for the DRC (World Bank : ). The CAF
(–) was a strategic tool for coordinating development pro-
grammes and reducing duplication. It enabled donors to claim to be
adhering to the  Paris Declaration on aid harmonisation, and even
allowed the French government to assert, in its – Partnership
Framework Document with the DRC (Document Cadre Partenariat :
section ..d), that France, Britain, Germany, Belgium, Holland and the
EC constituted ‘a hard core’ of European donors working on key sectors
identiﬁed within Congolese-led poverty programmes, notably the 
Poverty Reduction and Strategy Paper and the  Programme d’Actions
Prioritaires.
Nevertheless, while the UK and France shared a concern with poverty
reduction in the DRC, they disagreed over how to achieve this goal.
They shared their analyses and engaged in collective monitoring via
the CAF, but did not undertake joint donor programmes. The CAF
actually provided a cover behind which the UK persisted with policies,
such as the payment of school and health-user fees, which were – in
a country where corruption is rife – viewed as ‘naive’ by parts of
the French administration (AFD int., May ). Nor did it discourage
France from pumping aid into cultural projects, even though the
developmental merit of such activities was questioned by DFID.
Signiﬁcantly too, the CAF did not result in any direct bilateral
cooperation between the UK and France. Thus, while the DFID and
AFD exchanged information on water projects, and considered co-
funding health and education programmes (AFD int., May ), they
did not agree a common approach, even on issues, such as primary
education and healthcare, where the wider UK and French aid
administrations worked together constructively.
This lack of cooperation is all the more striking given that the UK and
French Foreign Ministers began calling for joint projects in late 
(ESDP mission int., May ). It can be attributed to a number of
factors, notably: the difference in weight between the DFID’s spending
capacity (with US$– million to devote to primary education) and
the AFD’s budget (with a maximum of US$ million); the issue of
timing: the UK and French aid agencies were, by , already engaged
in separate projects that could not easily be stopped (DFID and AFD
ints., May ); and the different relative priority that the UK and
France attached to poverty reduction. For UK policy makers, poverty
reduction was the central concern of all development work, and
perceived as a technical problem susceptible to technocratic solutions.
For French ofﬁcials, by contrast, poverty was more of a political problem
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while poverty-related targets were considered arbitrary and unrealistic
(French Foreign Ministry int., October ).
P R E S S U R E S F O R G R E A T E R C O O R D I N A T I O N
How then are we to account for the deconﬂictualisation of Anglo-French
ties? The ﬁrst driver pushing the UK and France to adopt a less
conﬂictual stance and even to engage in some degree of collaboration
was the election, in , of Tony Blair’s reformist and internationalist
Labour government which led to the creation of DFID and to a
commitment to tackling the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs),
across francophone as well as anglophone Africa. In France, the initial
catalyst was the election of Lionel Jospin’s modernising socialist
government. This resulted in a shift from unilateral to multilateral
approaches towards African peacekeeping and development, and in a
partial realignment of France’s diplomatic and military efforts to its key
commercial interests, many of which were in anglophone Africa.
Yet whilst these changes prepared the way for the  Saint-Malo
agreement promising collaboration on Africa, they did not automatically
result in Anglo-French cooperation in the DRC. Three subsequent
events ensured a less conﬂictual approach. The ﬁrst was the end of the
‘ofﬁcial’ conﬂict and the emergence of a transitional government by
mid . In such a fraught security context, there was ‘simply no scope’
for rival external power to pursue ‘nasty little games’ or hard-nosed
realist interests (EC int., May ). The second was the Iraq War, which
began in March . Although this engendered competition between
the UK and France over the second UN Resolution, it also encouraged
London and Paris to seek common ground elsewhere, notably in Africa,
where they could ‘make friends again’ (Viscount Slim, Hansard
..: col. ). The war also fortuitously provoked the resignation
of Clare Short, who had, through her friendship with Rwandan
President Paul Kagame and Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni, been a major
obstacle to Anglo-French cooperation. The third event was the
publication in October  of the ﬁnal and most authoritative UN
Panel Report, which shamed the UK into adopting a less indulgent
stance towards the Rwandan and Ugandan regimes, even if Rwanda
continued to enjoy a comparatively easy ride, as the muted UK
reaction to a damning  UN Group of Experts report revealed.
It was against this backdrop that the UK and France came to
appreciate how deconﬂictualisation and more active collaboration
could enable them better to pursue their broadly similar policy agendas
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in the DRC. By banding together particularly on military training and
SSR, these two middle-sized powers with costly commitments in other
troubled regions could make a more meaningful contribution to the
near-apocalyptic crisis facing the DRC. By working together, they could
garner a majority of the votes on the Security Council, not least since
France was the lead country on the DRC and viewed cooperation
with the UK as ‘the key’ to passing UNSC Resolutions (French
Foreign Ministry int., January ). By aligning their positions in the
EU, they could swing votes in the PSC, thereby securing approval for
ESDP military missions and overcoming resistance from states such as
Germany. Furthermore, by combining their efforts, the UK (as Rwanda’s
largest donor) and France (as the DRC’s most stalwart backer) could
help rein in Rwandan support for Tutsi rebels in the Congrès National
pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP), while also pressuring the Kabila
government to do more to disarm the FDLR. Signiﬁcantly too, Britain
and France could, by presenting a more united front on Congolese
sovereignty and Rwandan border security, limit the extent to which they
were played off against each other by Congolese and Rwandan policy
makers, who were expert at such manipulation (EU ofﬁcial int., Addis
Ababa, April ). By working together, London and Paris could,
moreover, better respond to the threats posed by the DRC, be they from
illegal immigration or from regional destabilisation: four of the DRC’s
nine neighbours are former British colonies and two are ex-French.
Finally, by pooling their resources, the UK and France could disguise
their relative decline in inﬂuence in Africa, and compensate for the fact
that they were ultimately only two players in a country where dynamic
new suitors included South Africa, Angola, India, Japan, the Middle
East countries and above all China, whose proposed ‘resources for
infrastructure’ loan was at one point as large as the DRC’s national
debt.
These pressures to adopt a better-coordinated approach struck a
chord with UK and French policy makers, who perceived some degree of
cooperation to be in the national interest and were, as signatories of the
 UN Resolution on Responsibility to Protect Populations, alarmed
at the prospect of a genocide of the sort that occurred in neighbouring
Rwanda. British policy makers were particularly receptive to lobbying
by the All Party Parliamentary Group on the Great Lakes region, the UK
Congo Forum and Oxfam. Such pressures were less prevalent on the
French side, although, particularly after the  election of President
Sarkozy, ofﬁcials were anxious to shore up France’s image throughout
the Great Lakes – including in Rwanda where past animosities were now
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seen as an obstacle to be overcome (French Foreign Ministry int.,
September ).
C O N S T R A I N T S O N C O O P E R A T I O N
Given the broad convergence of UK and French policy agendas, it
might seem surprising that there was so little active and absolutely no
‘sustained’ Anglo-French cooperation in the DRC. The explanation
appears to lie in perceived divergences in national interests, differing
behavioural norms that pushed the pursuit of a common policy agenda
along divergent paths, institutional obstacles, and resource constraints.
To begin with divergent interests, while these should not be exagger-
ated, the UK and France attached a different relative priority to the
DRC. For Britain, this populous central African country forms ‘one of
the frontiers of development, where the battle to achieve the MDGs will
be won or lost’ (Ivan Lewis, Hansard ..: col. ). For the
French, by contrast, the importance of the DRC lay not in the MDGs but
in its status as the second largest francophone country, with  million
French speakers as well as a key role within La Francophonie (French
Embassy Kinshasa, n.d.), and as a neighbour of Rwanda, a country that
had moved from the francophone to the anglophone sphere of
inﬂuence, and had had an actively hostile relationship with Paris since
.
These divergent foreign policy priorities restricted collaboration and
engendered suspicion between DFID ofﬁcials, who were disappointed by
France’s low level of ‘development spending’ in the DRC (see Table )
and wary that the French might try to ‘take credit for DFID money’
(former UK Minister int., December ), and French policy makers,
who were suspicious of British motives for establishing such a large
aid programme and mission in a francophone country. This lack of
trust reduced the scope for cooperation, even in areas where the UK
and France could potentially compensate for each other’s resource
constraints (see below). This mutual suspicion was, moreover, com-
pounded by divergent economic interests which, although marginal,
could not be dismissed altogether. Thus, while the UK’s exports made
up only one per cent of the total market in  and its diplomatic
mission provided only ad hoc support to UK investors (Kisangani &
Bobb : ), Britain did have mining interests in the DRC
and, through the British-based company Tullow, a stake in offshore
oilﬁelds. Similarly, although France currently had little direct invest-
ment, it was developing, through the French-based multinational Areva,
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a strong interest in uranium exploration. It also ranked as the third
largest exporter to the DRC, had a sizeable trade surplus (Emillion in
), and actively supported French companies seeking to invest there
(French Embassy Kinshasa, n.d.).
Another brake on cooperation came from different behavioural
norms: the UK and France promoted those procedures to which each
was attached at a normative level, and was best equipped and resourced
to provide. The UK’s attachment to community policing, technocratic
poverty reduction targets and fast-disbursing aid, all internationally
recognised areas of British expertise, should be understood in this
light. France’s emphasis on riot control, hard military assistance and
visible project work (all emblematic of French approaches to crises
and overseas development) should equally be understood in these
terms. The DFID’s reluctance to channel assistance through the DRC
authorities and its readiness to turn instead to international organis-
ations and NGOs as aid operators was also relevant, as was the French
government’s preference, wherever possible, for funnelling monies
through its own development agencies (AFD int., May ).
Anglo-French coordination was further hampered by institutional
constraints, the most important of which was the lack of any French
equivalent to DFID, with its forty-strong mission, technocratic expertise
and focus on institutional processes (DFID : ). The much smaller
French aid mission, the SCAC, had a strong cultural focus, while the ﬁve-
strong AFD agency retained a banking culture and a predilection for
proﬁtable investment projects. This institutional misalignment was
compounded by different policy styles and internal divisions within
the British and French administrations. The UK adopted a low-key,
consultative policy style, aimed at deﬂecting DRC government suspi-
cions of Britain’s presence, while France assumed a high-proﬁle stance,
designed to signal support for the Kabila administration. A case in
point was France’s  ‘Sarkozy Plan’, a unilateral initiative aimed at
unlocking the dispute between Rwanda and the DRC over mineral
resources and border security. Turning to internal divisions, these were
subtle but important. Thus, while the British mission in Kinshasa won
the Civil Service award for ‘joined-up government’ in , divergences
remained between, for example, DFID and the MoD over the pro-
portion of the SSR budget allocated to defence (DFID : ). In
France’s case, divisions were evident between the Foreign Ministry and
the Elysée, notably over the proposed intervention in the Kivus in .
Finally, coordination was held back by resource constraints – limitations
on the capacity of the British and French states to secure the material
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and political support required to pursue their preferred policies. In this
context, the UK found it easy to increase resources in the form of aid
for developmental and humanitarian goals. Thus, as can be seen
from Table , UK governments rapidly increased ofﬁcial development
assistance (ODA) to the DRC from US$. million a year in –
 (a quarter of the OECD donor average) to $.million in 
(almost ﬁve times the Development Assistance Committee (DAC)
average). Over the same period, the UK – thanks to cross-party support
for aid coupled with the backing of NGOs and the media –moved from
being the DRC’s sixth to its second largest donor.
By contrast, France cut ODA from US$.million in  (two and
a half times the DAC average) to $. million in  (less than two
thirds of the OECD donor average). The French state equally slipped
from being one of the Congo’s top three donors to becoming its tenth
largest in . Its capacity to ratchet up long-term development aid was
limited by membership of the  European Stability Pact, internal
government-wide spending cuts, and the fact that France was the leading
contributor to the European Development Fund.
Conversely, the UK had problems galvanising support for ESDP
missions, not least due to its lack of French-speaking and other military
personnel, the need for parliamentary scrutiny of such missions and
the fact that MONUC already had a Chapter VII mandate. By contrast,
France found troop mobilisation easier thanks to the lack of parliamen-
tary oversight over presidential decisions, the pre-positioning of ,
French soldiers in Africa, and the way that ESDP missions served
France’s aim of making Europe a credible autonomous military force.
: : :
TA B L E 
Net ODA disbursements by the UK, France and the average
DAC donor to the DRC (US$m)
– –      
UK aid · · a · · · · ·
French aid · ·a ·  · · · ·
DAC averageb · · · · · · · ·
a These ﬁgures are inﬂated by large one-off debt cancellations.
b The DAC or ‘donors’ club’ now includes twenty-three leading OECD donors.
Source : OECD, various years.
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This article has shown how the UK and France went some way towards
burying the hatchet or at least sidelining past rivalries, particularly after
, when they adopted broadly similar policy agendas in response
to the challenges facing the DRC. The two countries opened up
new institutional channels for dialogue and even engaged in active, if
coincidental, cooperation on ‘hard’ security-related matters, such as
ESDP missions, as well as on the security dimensions of softer policy
issues such as democracy promotion, especially at critical moments in
the electoral cycle. In non-crisis situations, however, the UK and France
at best managed to deconﬂictualise, and in some cases only semi-
deconﬂictualise, their approaches. This lack of active cooperation was
especially evident in ‘soft’ policy areas, such as poverty reduction and the
civilian dimensions of SSR. Importantly too, they did not engage in any
‘sustained and reciprocal cooperation’ or, at least after , in any
active non-cooperation. The implication is that there was not enough at
stake in the DRC for the British and French to fall out seriously, or
devote too much energy to resolving issues that hampered collaboration,
speciﬁcally divergent interests, differing behavioural norms, institutional
obstacles and resource constraints.
Without wishing to detract from the signiﬁcance of recent instances
of active cooperation and indeed deconﬂictualisation (which can be
a prerequisite for conﬁdence-building and other forms of collabor-
ation), it is fair to say that Anglo-French coordination was largely
personality-driven, ‘insufﬁcient’ and ‘more virtual than real’ (AFD
int., May ). It was also far from exceptional, as the UK remained
closest to the USA on regional security, to the Netherlands on army
restructuring, and to South Africa on police reform, while the French
collaborated most with Belgium on water, education and army training
projects.
These ﬁndings beg two obvious questions. First, what are the wider
implications of this relative lack of collaboration? It could perhaps be
argued that, whether they worked together or separately, the UK and
France were ‘bit players’ compared with the USA, China and the
many multilateral organisations that poured resources into the DRC
(ex-FCO ofﬁcial int., ). This is certainly the view of one informed
commentator, Gérard Prunier (: ), who labelled the
Straw – Védrine  visit to the DRC ‘an obsolete display of great
power diplomacy’. In reality, however, the UK and France have
comparative advantages in the Great Lakes. When they work together,
they can mobilise ESDP missions, unblock impasses between the DRC
and Rwanda, and shape MONUC’s mandate. Their combined inﬂuence
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is all the greater in a context where the US is reluctant to take the lead
on SSR, China refuses to exert public pressure and, despite or perhaps
because of the scale of the human tragedy, no other external power
seems prepared to assume a leadership role.
Turning to our second question, what does the future hold for Anglo-
French collaboration? Clearly there are grounds for thinking that the
UK and France might engage in more sustained cooperation. For a start,
the issue of Rwanda should prove less of an obstacle to collaboration,
as London has begun to take seriously Rwanda’s democratic short-
comings and Paris restored diplomatic relations with Kigali in November
. Furthermore, the UK and France have, by harmonising their
stances on the Great Lakes, removed a potential obstacle to their
exerting greater leverage over EU African policy. By collaborating in this
region, the two countries might, moreover, help to shore up the ‘mould-
breaking’ defence agreements signed by the new British Prime Minister,
David Cameron, and French President Sarkozy in November  (UK
Minister int., November ). By working together at a time of global
ﬁnancial crisis, the two governments would, in addition, make savings
through greater burden-sharing, a process that could be taken further as
the role of the European External Action Service increases.
Ultimately, however, closer cooperation seems unlikely, not least with
the election in May  of a Conservative-dominated coalition
government in the UK. Given the Conservative Party’s anti-European
credentials and its overt emphasis on British trade, it may struggle to ﬁnd
common ground with a French administration that has pinned its
colours to the mast of European integration and is pushing its own
commercial interests more aggressively across Africa. Given also the
new Conservative-led government’s track record of supporting the
neo-liberal ‘reformist’ regime in Rwanda, it is unlikely – in a year when
fresh Congolese elections are due – to align itself to France’s now-
established policy of strong support for the Kabila government, which is
widely seen as incompetent and corrupt. Nor is there any immediate
prospect of the UK and French administrations moving towards a
uniﬁed Anglo-French view of the threats posed by the CNDP and
FDLR. If then, as seems likely, the British and French governments
remain unable to agree on a ‘common diagnosis’ of, and a ‘common
solution’ to, the problems facing the DRC (French Foreign Ministry int.,
July ), they will continue to exert limited inﬂuence over the Congo
and its neighbours. This will also further reduce any chance that this
conﬂict-ridden country – the ‘troubled heart of Africa’ –might have of
coming off life-support.
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N O T E S
. Oxfam’s description of the conﬂict involving the DRC and its neighbours was subsequently
echoed by former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright.
. The choice of the DRC plus Sierra Leone stemmed from a concern to ensure that the
illicit trade in diamonds and other rare commodities should not fuel African conﬂict
(Cahors Communiqué ).
. The other African country was Ghana.
. For an alternative typology of Anglo-French cooperation see Chafer .
. The UK, France, Belgium, the European Commission and UN audited the justice
sector in  and helped develop an Action Plan in . Donor efforts were scaled down
when the DRC’s elected government downgraded the priority attached to this sector (Melmot
: ).
. The European Commission alone provided E million in aid between  and 
(Keane : ). In May , MONUC was renamed the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission
in the DRC.
. This war pitted Congolese rebels, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and UNITA, against the
governments of the DRC, Angola, Chad, Namibia, Sudan and Zimbabwe.
. The Contact Group’s other founders were Belgium, the Netherlands, the EU and USA. The
International Facilitation also includes the EU and USA, as donors represented in eastern DRC.
. The UK provided English language training and the French military training (French Defence
Ministry int., ).
. The British and French Foreign Ministries both have an ofﬁcial in Goma, but cooperation is
not automatic (former FCO ofﬁcial int., June ).
. This group involves a dozen embassies and development partners.
. This contract set out DRC government priorities for reforming public ﬁnances and the
security sector (Keane : ).
. The group is regularly attended by representatives from the EU, the Netherlands, Sweden,
Canada, MONUC, the UNDP and DFID, which provides the secretariat.
. The other battle-group country, Germany, ‘killed the idea’, while most EU states were
unsupportive (MONUC int., ).
. Although the IPU was predominantly funded by the European Commission, the UK
earmarked money for training, while France provided twelve IPU trainers and separate riot police
training (Chivvis : ).
. DFID funded French military personnel on contracts, two French ofﬁcers and the (Belgian)
Head of EUSEC in Goma (ESDP mission int., May ).
. Although the UK supplied two of the original eight-strong EUSEC mission, it was, by ,
only providing one civilian employee out of a staff of forty-three (EUSEC ).
. France provided sixteen of EUSEC’s -strong team in December  (EUSEC ).
. This includes the establishment of a judicial police training school and a forensic laboratory.
. France allocated E million, almost a third of its – budget, for teaching French,
cultural diversity and governance (French Embassy Kinshasa n.d.).
. The UK government mooted the possibility of suspending aid in  (Africa News ..)
but failed to follow Sweden and Holland when they halted budgetary assistance to Rwanda in 
(AFP ..).
. This report condemned Rwandan support for the CNDP and Congolese backing of the FDLR
(UNSC ).
. The DRC is in the top twenty countries of interest for UK Border Agency (FCO : ).
. Under donor pressure, the terms of the loan were softened and the amount reduced from
US$. billion to  billion (Jeune Afrique –..), thereby clearing the way for a $. billion
debt cancellation by the Paris Club (La Prosperité ..).
. The campaign (‘ ans de guerre’) led by Oxfam France is the exception. It pressed the
French state to hold the countries of the Great Lakes to their pledges on border security
(Oxfam France ).
. The DRC hosts the UK’s seventh largest mission in Africa (FCO : ).
. British-owned companies include AngloGold Ashanti and Katanga Mining.
. DFID disburses % of its aid through the World Bank and IMF, and a third through
international NGOs (DFID : ).
. In – over a third of DFID’s programme remained humanitarian (DFID : –).
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. Conservative Development Minister, Lynda Chalker, developed a friendship with Kagame in
the mid s. David Cameron visited Rwanda on his ﬁrst trip to Africa as Conservative Party leader
(Telegraph Blog ).
. According to one former FCO ofﬁcial (int., June ), the UK and France will
‘stick stubbornly to their guns’ on rebel groups, since non-cooperation has few direct ‘political
consequences’ in a region of marginal interest.
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EC European Commission
ESDP mission DRC, European Security and Defence Policy mission
EU European Union
ex-FCO ofﬁcial former UK Foreign & Commonwealth Ofﬁce
former FCO ofﬁcial former UK Foreign & Commonwealth Ofﬁce
FCO UK, Foreign & Commonwealth Ofﬁce
former UK Minister UK, Minister in the Labour government, to 
French Defence Ministry France, Ministère de la Defense Nationale
French Foreign Ministry France, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères
MoD UK, Ministry of Defence
MONUC UN, Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo
UK Minister UK, Minister in the Coalition government, from 
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